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Oleksandr Pavlyuk

I will start with the obvious. The international system is subject to constant changes. These changes are caused by current events and by the gradual deeper transformations of the foundation of world power. When a sufficient mass of critical changes is accumulated, the quality shift will happen. 

Now, there is a sense that deeper changes are taking place in the world. Although it is not yet clear when these changes might come, I think that certain deeper trends have emerged even before the global economic crisis. Many analysts drew attention to some of those trends. I will briefly mention some of them which have relevance to today’s discussion. 

The first trend is “the return of the capitalist authoritarian states”.  Some years ago, it was argued that economically successful authoritarian capitalist states represent an attractive alternative to liberal democracy. Some even predicted that the global competition of the 21st century will take place between democratic governance and autocratic governance. Some time ago, one journal published an exchange of letters between Robert Cooper, from the European Commission, and Robert Kagan, a prominent American thinker. One argued that a well-run democracy and market economy will always be stronger than any authoritarian state. The other argued that democracies are inherently stronger in the long-run, but the long-run can take decades or centuries. Following the outburst of the global economic crisis, this competition is becoming even more important.

The second trend, coined by Fareed Zakaria, is “the rise of the rest”, which means a shift in the global balance of power. Zakaria pointed out that “the rise of the rest” is the third great power shift in the modern era. First, there was the rise of the West. Then, there was the  rise of the United States.  Now, we are witnessing the rise of the rest.  

The third trend is “the return of the great power politics”. Great powers may play a more important role in world and European politics.

I believe that certain security risks have emerged before the crisis.  These risks include:  the return of armed conflict and the use of force (as we saw it in 2008) (This remains an option even on the European continent); the stalemate in arms control; the issue of energy security; the erosion of the very concept of cooperative security; and the slowdown of EU and NATO enlargement which have been a dominant feature on the European continent for many years. This slowdown challenges the vision and the completion of the project of a democratic, peaceful and united Europe. The image of the so called ‘coloured revolutions’ is tarnished.  

Did the global crisis confirm these trends? Did it accelerate them or reverse them? I think that it is difficult to make any ultimate conclusions at this stage because the long-term impact of the crisis on politics and security in wider Europe is not yet visible. Today, we can talk about the immediate impact of the crisis on democratic development, stability and the balance of power in this part of the world.  So far, we can say that no state has been immune to the crisis. However, its implications might be stronger for some.   

I will make only two observations on the impact of the crisis on political and democratic development in the region, as well as on regional security. First, the crisis has not produced, at least visibly, any immediate radical impact on national politics and democratic development in wider Europe. There were no regime changes, not even a government change. For example, in the recent presidential elections in Romania, the incumbent president was re-elected.  Even in those countries, for example in Moldova or in Greece, where the governments were changed, those elected represent mainstream political parties. They do not come from the radical left or from the radical right.

During the crisis, we talk more about interests and less about values.  The values of liberal democracy are increasingly challenged. Some argue that it was liberal democracy that led to the crisis. Last month, during the world economic forum in Dubai, the model of democratic governance was increasingly questioned by many, while the arguments of the advocates of democracy were rather weak. Democracy was not a Chinese point of view, but rather the view of business leaders from Europe and the United States. It marks a remarkable change: 40 years ago the countries in new Europe recognised in the Paris Charter that democracy is “the only system of government of our nation”.   

Second, the crisis did not produce any invisible impact on security in the region. However, it has contributed to a deeper sense of insecurity in some countries. Many countries in the region, especially those that are not members of the EU and NATO, have found themselves in the most difficult situation. That’s why there is a debate on how the security of these countries can be guaranteed. These countries were hard hit by the economic crisis. Of course, there were Iceland, Ireland, Spain and Greece. However, those countries, being members of the EU, can count on its support  They also have stronger democracies, stronger political institutions and stronger traditions. 

Increased domestic vulnerability coincides with the current debate about the future of the European security architecture. I was surprised that the Russian proposal of the European Security Treaty was not mentioned today. It is now actively debated in Europe. This debate might affect the countries in the wider Black Sea region, in particular Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan, maybe Armenia and Belarus. The European Security Treaty is meant to be signed by 56 OSCE participating states and 5 security organisations – EU, NATO, OSCE, CIS and CSTO.  Ukraine and Moldova are members of only two organisations; Georgia is a member of one organisation. This proposal is something that these countries might want to think about.

The countries I just mentioned will have to make important policy choices.  These choices are likely to shape their future for many years to come and will have to be made in the context of domestic economic difficulties and political instability, elections-related turbulences and strategic discussions about European future and world security. 

There are two key questions:  What is the best way to ensure the security of these countries? What is their way to modernity, democracy and prosperity?  

I deliberately did not speak about the EU because there are other speakers more qualified to do so. Will the EU, confronted with many problems and challenges, be willing and able to become more effective in creating conditions for peace, security and prosperity in its neighbourhood?  I believe that these questions will shape the future of this part of the world. Thank you for your attention.

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