Dimitrios Triantaphyllou
21-01-2010
I would like to focus on the political implications of the global economic and financial crisis. Although the moderator asked us to focus on the broader region rather than the EU, I think that it is fundamentally important to rethink the EU’s role in the region. Let me pose a few questions that I will try to answer: Is there a link between the global economic crisis and governance? What is its impact on democracy? What is its impact on the EU? Does the crisis provide opportunities?
By definition, a crisis means adjustments and instability. However, it also provides opportunities. The current crisis is no exception to this rule. We have to assess different elements of the crisis to see how we can move forward in terms of opportunities.
The crisis is likely to bring opportunities for a new world balance. In a way, it has been highlighted by the election of Barack Obama, who received a Nobel Peace Prize. His speech in Oslo marks a change in the rhetoric into the direction of realism. Despite Obama’s shift in foreign policy, some things have not happened the way he wanted. Now, we are in the process of “reset”, or what Sergey Karaganov calls the “reconfiguration” of the Russia-US relationship. We also have to consider the Russian proposal for a European Security Treaty and the proposals regarding energy. Therefore, we are somewhere in between constructive, cooperative action and new, tougher actions. The August 2008 war was another disturbing point for the region and world security. In addition, we have a number of persisting security threats: the killing fields in Gaza and elsewhere, the terrorist attacks on Mumbai and the implications for India’s relationship with Pakistan, and so on. Many states are going through a number of dilemmas and transitions.
In the Black Sea region, the economic aspect is very interesting. Since the end of the Cold War, the region has had at least three different phases.
The first decade was one of tough transition. Economic and political indicators were not very good and not very comforting. When one looks at the indicators of 2000-2008, one can see in 12 BSEC member-states a cumulative growth of 6 % per annum. This accounted for a cumulative real economic expansion of 68%. In 2010, the growth is projected at -6.4 % .This in an immediate effect of the crisis, and now we enter the third phase of the crisis. Nevertheless, the region is very different from what it was 2 decades ago. This is something that we should keep in mind.
When the crisis started hitting the region, it had an impact on governance. One of the implications of the crisis is what I call “democratic backlash”. Where can one see the effects of democratic backlash? For example, there is the case of a young scholar who was arrested in Latvia not so long ago for allegedly spreading rumors and untruthful information. He warned his compatriots not to keep money in the banks, especially in his country’s currency. Here we are talking about an EU member-state, and not neighbouring countries.
In the countries of Eastern and Central Europe, scholars are concerned about the ability of new and less consolidated democracies to avoid political breakdowns, especially in the context of sharp drops in incomes and increased unemployment. National jingoism has also been on the rise. There is less willingness to work with neighbors, especially when those neighbors are outside of the EU. There is also competition for funds within the EU now that these states find themselves in a post-transition phase. New political and economic elites have emerged; and they try to consolidate institutions without participation by forming policy consensus at the expense of politics. Therefore, populist backlash is occurring as a result of corrupt and self-interested elites, and also due to the appearance of charismatic leaders who are capable of mobilizing public anger.
A key player in this arena is the European Union. This is a unique institution of shared sovereignty among 27 democratic states. Its foreign policy approach is one which could be called an ethical foreign policy. This comprehensive and cooperative foreign policy clashes with the return to Realpolitik, especially when it comes to the United States and other regional hegemons such as Russia and, to a certain extent, Turkey. This is something that the EU has to deal with given that the democracy paradigm is a part of the message that it wants to export to its neighbourhood.
As a result of the economic crisis, democratic turbulences cannot help but trouble the EU. The fact that more people are concerned with the domestic situation in the countries within the EU has an impact on its power of attraction beyond its borders. In these uncertain times, the state of the Union’s relations with its neighbors to the East reflects or mirrors its state of mind – somewhere between the perseverance of national egoisms and prerogatives and the need for more joint coordinated strategies.
Let’s move to Russia, another key player. While talking about the EU, we were talking about the democracy paradigm. When it comes to Russia, we have a different paradigm, the sovereignty paradigm. A growing consensus is emerging that Russia’s elite believe that the biggest threat to Russia’s freedom is weakness in the face of foreign influence rather than authoritarianism at home. There were many questions about Russia’s ability to survive the crisis. So far, the regime has found a way to maintain its credibility at home.
Turkey is another regional hegemon. Over the last few years, Russia and Turkey have formed a shared hegemony, a condominium in the Black Sea region. In the Turkish case, the crisis parallels the shift in the rhetoric. Turkey is changing its foreign policy and is promoting itself as a regional soft power. Turkish elite try to project their country as a regional soft power playing its Islamic card. It still remains to be seen whether Turkish foreign policy will transform from the rhetoric into practice.
The crisis is seen as contributing to the de-legitimization of Western leadership in general and American predominance in particular. Therefore, for Turkey, the crisis offers an opportunity for a more diverse foreign policy approach.
The issue of energy security also signals in many ways the return to Realpolitik. Energy, oil and natural gas are commodities that flow across the borders, and they should be commodities enhancing cooperation. What is the use of energy resources if they cannot be sold to the rest of the world? This is also part of the great power game and shifting allegiances in the post-crisis period.
How do smaller neighbouring states of Russia, Turkey and the EU see their role in this context? How do they look ahead? Should we assume that the crisis will last some 12 or 18 months, as many economists say? Obviously, the crisis brings to the forefront the need for coordination among nation-states and organisations within the current global financial architecture. Also, it generates debate over the design of a new global structure, the issue of global governance, not just institutional governance, but also good governance within the States. The question is how to turn the negative impact of the crisis into an opportunity. I would say that the crisis presents an opportunity for a new paradigm, a new strategy for the EU and Black Sea region. This paradigm should accommodate the interests of regional hegemons, Russia and Turkey, as well as those of smaller and less powerful neighbors. (Talking to my Turkish friends, I realised that the word “hegemon” is negatively perceived in Turkey. I don’t want to be misunderstood. I use the word “hegemon” in the context of international relations where it implies a great power.)
How is this new paradigm accommodating the interests of all? I think that the focus should be on stopping EU neighboring states from collapse and curbing the spheres of influence in the regions. This is a challenge, and a formulation of a new regional policy may be necessary.
This implies work on two fronts. The EU will have to regain the upper hand in building solidarity for joint action. It may be good news for the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty. Externally, the EU has to use its power of attraction, which is also a challenge. It depends on the political will whether the EU can take the lead. Looking at some partnerships that have been there, it is clear that some of these ideas have been implemented. We try to implement it in the Black Sea region, but we need to put more focus on partnerships, environmental policies, climate change and so on.
The financial crisis has highlighted the problems of the current financial order and the need for its repair. It has also magnified the political implications of inaction as populism, nationalism and jingoism are on the rise inside and outside the EU. Therefore, the crisis provides an opportunity to leap forward through the modernization of the leadership, the pulling together of resources and concerted actions. I think that the EU through its efforts of solidarity and cumulative action will free itself from the shackles of perennial treaty ratifications and will assume the responsibility for managing the European continent and accounting for the interests of both great powers and smaller democratic neighbours that need to be assured that their integrations are on track.
I am back to what I have said in the beginning. Maybe we should also think of the EU as a regional stakeholder. Being a regional stakeholder does not mean membership for the countries in the region. Let’s look at BSEC - 12 member states. Three of them are EU members (Greece, Bulgaria and Romania). Within the BSEC, you have Serbia and Albania and Turkey that are linked to the EU. Most of BSEC observers are EU members as well. That is a tremendous power of influence. Is the EU a Black Sea power? If yes, then how is it perceived by the smaller countries? How is it going to be perceived by its bigger neighbours, Russian and Turkey? How will this perception help in the direction of joint action to tackle the economic crisis and beyond?
